The FIPS 199 categorization determines the impact level for the whole system. Use the high-water mark across confidentiality, integrity, and availability, then make the authorization boundary match that decision.
Impact Categorization
| Security Objective | Low Impact Case | Moderate Impact Case | High Impact Case | Current Assessment |
|---|
| Confidentiality | Unauthorized disclosure causes limited adverse effect. | Unauthorized disclosure causes serious adverse effect, including regulated PII or sensitive government workflow data. | Unauthorized disclosure causes severe or catastrophic effect, including law enforcement, emergency, health, financial, or other high-impact data. | [FILL IN] |
| Integrity | Unauthorized modification causes limited adverse effect. | Unauthorized modification causes serious mission, financial, legal, or operational harm. | Unauthorized modification causes severe mission failure, public safety harm, or catastrophic financial harm. | [FILL IN] |
| Availability | Disruption causes limited adverse effect. | Disruption causes serious degradation of government service delivery. | Disruption causes severe mission failure or public safety risk. | [FILL IN] |
Baseline Decision
| Field | Value |
|---|
| High-water mark | [FILL IN: Low, Moderate, or High] |
| Recommended FedRAMP baseline | [FILL IN: Low, Li-SaaS, Moderate, or High] |
| Baseline rationale | [FILL IN: concise rationale tied to data and mission impact] |
| Decision owner | [FILL IN] |
| Decision date | [FILL IN] |
| Revisit cadence | At least annually and after significant data, architecture, mission, or customer changes. |
Data Inventory
| Data Type | Example | Source | Storage Location | External Sharing | Impact Driver |
|---|
| Public product content | Documentation and marketing pages | Internal authors | Static hosting and repository | Public | Low confidentiality |
| Account data | User identity, roles, email, audit metadata | Users and IdP | Application database and IdP | Limited subprocessors | Moderate confidentiality |
| Government workflow data | [FILL IN] | [FILL IN] | [FILL IN] | [FILL IN] | [FILL IN] |
| Audit logs | Login, admin, configuration, release, and data-access events | Application, GitHub, Kubernetes, Argo CD | Log store and object storage | 3PAO and agency review | Integrity and accountability |
| Secrets | API keys, tokens, credentials, signing keys | Secret manager and CI/CD | Secret manager, KMS, CI secrets | No external sharing | High control sensitivity |
Authorization Boundary
In Boundary
| Component | Technology | Owner | Evidence |
|---|
| Web application | React, Astro SSR, @dmwd-io/design-system | Application Engineering | Build logs, tests, accessibility results, release artifacts |
| API services | Go Fiber and TypeScript endpoints | Application Engineering | API tests, OpenAPI contracts, audit events |
| Data stores | Postgres and SQLite where approved | Platform Engineering | Encryption settings, backups, access grants |
| Kubernetes runtime | Kubernetes, Helm, Argo CD | Platform Engineering | Cluster policy reports, sync history, admission policy results |
| CI/CD | GitHub Actions | Platform Engineering | Workflow logs, approvals, SARIF, signed artifacts |
| Observability | OpenTelemetry, Prometheus, logs, dashboards | Platform Engineering | Dashboards, alert history, retention exports |
External or Inherited
| Service | Relationship | Inherited Controls | Evidence Needed |
|---|
| Cloud provider | Infrastructure hosting | Physical security, facility, selected platform controls | FedRAMP package or responsibility matrix |
| GitHub | Source control and CI/CD | Repository access, audit logs, workflow controls where configured | Enterprise audit exports, branch protection screenshots or API exports |
| Identity provider | Workforce and customer identity | MFA, federation, lifecycle where configured | IdP policy export, access review evidence |
| Secret manager | Secret storage and rotation | Secret encryption, access logging, rotation support | Configuration export and access logs |
| Email or notification service | Transactional messaging | Message delivery and provider security controls | Data-processing and authorization evidence |
Boundary Diagram Placeholder
Add a diagram after the boundary is stable. The diagram should show users, IdP, browser, application, API services, databases, object storage, Kubernetes, CI/CD, logging, monitoring, backup storage, external services, and every trust boundary.
Data Flow Checklist
Boundary Control Questions
| Question | Answer |
|---|
| Which users can enter the boundary? | [FILL IN] |
| Which administrators can change production? | [FILL IN] |
| Which systems can call production APIs? | [FILL IN] |
| Which data leaves the boundary? | [FILL IN] |
| Which controls are inherited from hosting providers? | [FILL IN] |
| Which controls are inherited from identity, source control, or CI/CD providers? | [FILL IN] |
| Which controls are fully implemented by dmwd.io? | [FILL IN] |
| Which controls are shared? | [FILL IN] |